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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
SOUTHERN DIVISION
STEVEN LAPIER,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 10-CV-2851 AW
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, 
MARYLAND et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court has 
reviewed the record and deems no hearing necessary. For the following reasons, the Court 
GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Court takes the following facts from its prior Memorandum Opinions, supplementing 
them as necessary to reflect subsequent developments in the record. Plaintiff Steven LaPier 
(Plaintiff) began training as a student officer at the Prince George’s County Police Department 
(Department) in October 2008. On or around April 9, 2009, Plaintiff passed out during a training 
run. About a week later, the Department’s fitness coordinator prepared a memo in which he 
discussed the progress, or lack thereof, in Plaintiff’s fitness. Doc. No. 16-5. The memo states 
that, on November 6, 2008, Plaintiff completed a 1.5 mile fitness run in 17:30. The memo also 
states that, on March 31, 2009, Plaintiff completed the next 1.5 mile fitness run in only 21:43.
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Plaintiff was hospitalized subsequent to his fainting incident. He was diagnosed with 
Osler-Weber-Rendu syndrome, which evidently is a chronic blood disorder that causes decreased 
oxygen in the blood. Subsequent to his diagnosis, Plaintiff returned to work and was placed on 
light duty for one week. Plaintiff alleges that he resumed normal training activities after one 
week, including completing training runs. Plaintiff does not state how long these runs were or in 
what time he completed them.
The County's Medical Advisory Board (MAB) met on June 4, 2009. The MAB reviewed 
Plaintiff's medical records, determined him to be unfit for duty, and recommended his separation 
from the Department. Roberto L. Hylton, then Chief of Police of the Department, advised 
Plaintiff of the Board’s recommendation in a letter he signed on June 9, 2009 and delivered on 
June 18, 2009. A day after Plaintiff received the termination letter, he complained to Hylton 
about the alleged mistreatment of fellow cadets. Later, Plaintiff appealed the MAB’s 
recommendation that Hylton terminate him to the County Personnel Board. Plaintiff was 
represented by legal counsel during his appeal and was permitted to produce witness testimony 
on his behalf. Plaintiff's appeal was unsuccessful.
On October 14, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Complaint containing the following claims: First 
Amendment retaliation; wrongful discharge; disability discrimination under the ADAAA1 and 
Rehabilitation Act; disability discrimination under Maryland law; and age discrimination under 
Maryland law. On September 27, 2011, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order 
dismissing Plaintiff's state claims with prejudice and federal claims without prejudice. Doc. Nos. 
19-20. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, reasserting his federal claims and adding a federal 
claim for violation of procedural due process. Defendants again moved to dismiss. The Court
1 Plaintiff s claim is technically under both the ADA and the ADAAA. The Court will refer to Plaintiff s 
ADA/ADAAA claim as an ADAAA claim.
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issued a second Memorandum Opinion and Order (Second Opinion) in which it dismissed 
Plaintiff’s First Amendment and procedural due process claims with prejudice. The Court also 
dismissed the Department and Chief Hylton from the suit. However, the Court allowed 
Plaintiff’s federal disability discrimination claims to go into discovery.
After discovery, the County, as the sole remaining Defendant, moved for summary 
judgment. Doc. No. 40. The County’s Motion is ripe.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986). The Court must 
“draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, including questions of 
credibility and of the weight to be accorded to particular evidence.” Masson v. New Yorker 
Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 520 (1991) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
255 (1986)). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must come 
forward with affidavits or similar evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. 
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). A disputed fact 
presents a genuine issue “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 
the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Material disputes are those that “might affect 
the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id.
Although the Court should believe the evidence of the nonmoving party and draw all 
justifiable inferences in his or her favor, the nonmoving party cannot create a genuine dispute of 
material fact “through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another.” See Beal 
v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985). Further, if a party “fails to properly support an
3
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assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 
56(c), the court may consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(e)(2). Finally, hearsay statements or conclusory statements with no evidentiary basis cannot 
support or defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Greensboro Prof’l Firefighters A ss’n, 
Local 3157 v. City o f Greensboro, 64 F.3d 962, 967 (4th Cir. 1995).
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. AD AAA Claim
The ADAAA generally prohibits employers from discriminating against qualified 
individuals on the basis of disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Such discrimination includes 
“not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical . . . limitations of an otherwise 
qualified individual with a disability . . . .” Id. § 12112(5)(A). “The term ‘qualified individual’ 
means an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential 
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” Id. § 12111(8).
Under the ADAAA, an individual can show that he is actually disabled in three ways, 
only two of which are relevant to this case. An individual can show that he suffers from “a 
physical . . . impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such 
individual.” Id. § 12102(1)(A). Alternatively, an individual can show that his employer regarded 
him as having such an impairment. Id. § 12102(1)(C). An employee may satisfy the latter 
definition by showing that his employer subjected him to discrimination “because of a . . . 
perceived . . . impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major 
life activity.” Id. § 12102(3)(A).
In this case, a reasonable juror could conclude that Plaintiff has a substantial physical 
impairment that limits at least one major life activity. Although the evidence is somewhat
4
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unclear as to precisely what impairment Plaintiff has, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that 
Plaintiff has a vascular or blood condition that considerably restricts his ability to work, breathe, 
and/or to have proper circulation. See, e.g., Doc. No. 11-1. A reasonable juror could also 
conclude that the County regarded Plaintiff as having a disability. It is undisputed that the 
County had medical documentation discussing Plaintiff’s blood condition and relied on it in 
determining that he was unfit for duty.
Thus, the issue is whether Plaintiff could, with or without reasonable accommodation, 
perform the essential functions of a police officer. Id. § 12111(8). Due consideration must be 
given to “the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential.” See 42 U.S.C. § 
12111(8). Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes the work experience of 
incumbents in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n). Responding to emergencies and making 
forceful arrests are essential functions of a police officer. See Champ v. Baltimore County, 884 F. 
Supp. 991, 997 (D. Md. 1995). Therefore, as a measure of job fitness, employers may require 
applicants or cadets to complete training runs in a certain amount of time. Cf. Lanning v. Se. Pa. 
Transp. Auth., 308 F.3d 286, 288 (3d Cir. 2002) (pre-hire, pre-training ability to complete 1.5 
mile run within twelve minutes measured the minimum aerobic capacity necessary to 
successfully perform the job of a transit police officer).
In this case, no reasonable juror could conclude that Plaintiff could perform the essential 
functions of a police officer without a reasonable accommodation. The Department’s 
performance standards require police officers make arrests, respond to emergency calls, and 
aggressively patrol assigned areas. See Doc. No. 6-8. The Department’s standards also state that 
cadets in Plaintiff’s age cohort must complete 1.5 mile runs in 12:55 to 13:44 to obtain an 
average fitness score. Any time slower than 14:45 receives a fitness score of “0.” See Doc. No.
5
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16-5. It is undisputed that Plaintiff completed his first 1.5 mile fitness run in 17:30 and his 
second in 21:43. These times are considerably slower than the Department’s standards. Indeed, 
the County’s medical expert describes the faster 17:30 time as “not faster than a fast walk.” Doc. 
No. 40-6 at 10. Although Plaintiff vaguely states that he completed all his training runs when he 
came off of light duty, see Doc. No. 16-9 at 47, he never unequivocally states that he 
completed—or even could complete—a fitness run in a minimally acceptable time. Accordingly, 
no reasonable juror could conclude that Plaintiff could perform the essential functions of a police 
officer without a reasonable accommodation.
The next question is whether Plaintiff could have performed the functions of a police 
officer with a reasonable accommodation. “Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that [he] 
could perform the essential functions of [his] job with reasonable accommodation.” Tyndall v. 
Nat'lEduc. Ctrs., Inc. o f Ca., 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff 
completely fails to argue in his opposition that he could have performed the essential functions 
of the job with a reasonable accommodation. Indeed, Plaintiff devotes the vast bulk of his 
response to discussing claims that the Court has already dismissed. Nor does Plaintiff’s affidavit 
create a genuine dispute about whether he could have performed the essential functions of the 
job. Although Plaintiff references a handful of doctor’s letters stating that his blood condition did 
not prevent him from being a police officer, none of these documents even attempts to explain 
how a reasonable accommodation would have rendered Plaintiff sufficiently fit to perform his 
job duties. See Doc. No. 11-1 at 5-6, 10-11. And although Plaintiff could argue that the County 
should have kept him on light duty permanently, this argument would fail because permanent, 
light-duty positions would effectively eliminate the essential functions of chasing suspects on 
foot and making forcible arrests. See Allen v. Hamm, No. Civ.A. RDB 05-879, 2006 WL 436054,
6
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at *11 (D. Md. Feb. 22, 2006) (citations omitted). Accordingly, no reasonable juror could 
conclude that Plaintiff could have performed the essential functions of a police officer with a 
reasonable accommodation.
Although Plaintiff makes no such argument, one might argue that the County’s decision 
to terminate him was based on impermissible animus against persons with disabilities. As 
Plaintiff has presented no direct evidence of discrimination, the McDonnell Douglas scheme of 
proof would apply to such a claim. See Ennis v. Nat’l A ss’n o f Bus. and Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 
F.3d 55, 58 (4th Cir. 1995). To state a prima face case under the ADAAA, the plaintiff must 
“prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) [he] was in the protected class; (2) [he] was 
discharged; (3) at the time of the discharge, [he] was performing [his] job at a level that met [his] 
employer’s legitimate expectations; and (4) [his] discharge occurred under circumstances that 
raise a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination.” See id. (citations omitted). “[I]f a prima 
facie case is presented, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Blakes v. City o f Hyattsville, Civil 
Action No. 10-CV-3585 AW, 2012 WL 5566784, at *6 (D. Md. 2012) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). “Where the employer articulates a nondiscriminatory reason for the 
adverse employment action, the McDonnell Douglas framework—with its presumptions and 
burdens—disappears], and the sole remaining issue [is] discrimination vel non.” Id. (alterations 
in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “In other words, the burden shifts 
back to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s stated 
reasons were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Id. (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). “Whether judgment as a matter of law is appropriate in any particular 
case will depend on a number of factors.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
7
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“Those include the strength of the plaintiffs prima facie case, the probative value of the proof 
that the employer’s explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer’s 
case . . . .” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, Plaintiff has failed to present a prima facie case of disability discrimination. 
Although Plaintiff is arguably in a protected class (i.e., disabled) and was terminated, no 
reasonable juror could conclude that Plaintiff was performing his job at a level that met the 
County’s legitimate expectations when it fired him. To support this conclusion, the Court 
incorporates by reference its analysis regarding Plaintiff’s undisputed inability to meet the 
Department’s physical fitness standards for training runs. Nor could a reasonable juror conclude 
that the discharge occurred under circumstances raising a reasonable inference of discrimination. 
Plaintiff has submitted no comparative, statistical, qualitative, or any other form of 
circumstantial evidence from which one could infer that the County terminated him “on the basis 
o f’ disability. Rather, Plaintiff speculates that the County terminated him because he complained 
about the mistreatment of cadets. However, as the Court held in its Second Opinion, Plaintiff’s 
allegations do not support the inference that the County retaliated against him as Chief Hylton 
terminated him several days before Plaintiff complained. Moreover, even if Plaintiff’s 
allegations supported an inference of retaliation, retaliation and discrimination are analytically 
distinguishable motives. See Tasciyan v. Med. Numerics, 820 F. Supp. 2d 664, 674-75 (D. Md. 
2011) (“[A]n allegation of retaliation, per se, is insufficient to justify the inference that the firing 
owed to the employee’s [protected status].”). Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a prima facie 
case of disability discrimination.
Even if Plaintiff’s allegations sufficed to state a prima facie case, he has failed to rebut 
the County’s nondiscriminatory reasons for firing him. The County contends that it terminated
8
Case 8:10-cv-02851-AW Document 48 Filed 02/07/13 Page 9 of 9
Plaintiff because of his inability to do his job duties due to his blood condition and the danger 
this inability posed to the public. Yet “the strength of Plaintiff’s prima facie case is nonexistent 
as no reasonable juror could conclude that he has made out one.” Blakes, 2012 WL 5566784, at 
*6. “Therefore, the probative value of Plaintiff’s proof that Defendant’s] nondiscriminatory 
reason is false must be exceedingly high.” Id. Here, however, Plaintiff has submitted no evidence 
purporting to show that the County’s explanation of its decision is false. Accordingly, no 
reasonable juror could conclude that the County fired Plaintiff based on impermissible animus 
against persons with disabilities.
B. Rehabilitation Act Claim
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability . . . [shall] be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Courts use the same standards to analyze a 
claim for discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act as they do a claim for discrimination under 
the AD AAA. See AD AAA, Pub. L. 110-325, § 7(1), 122 Stat 3553, 3558 (amending the 
Rehabilitation Act to incorporate the ADAAA’s definition of disability); see also Cochran v. 
Holder, No. 10-1548, 2011 WL 2451724, at *3 (4th Cir. June 21, 2011) (citations omitted). 
Therefore, because Plaintiff’s ADAAA claim is not viable, the County is not liable under the 
Rehabilitation Act.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the County’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment. A separate Order follows.
_____ February 7, 2013______  ____________ /s/___________
Date Alexander Williams, Jr.
United States District Judge
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